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fig. 1- Vauban: builder of fortresses. ·
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THE MARQUIS DE VAUBAN AND MILITARY FORTIFICATIONS
by

•

Lee H. Hanson, Jr.

The Marquis de Sebastien Le Prestre Vauban died in 1707. During his life·
time he was the chief military engineer for Louis XIV and was responsible for
building or strengthening over 300 fortified positions. He wrote a manuscript on
siegecraft which was not published until several years after his death, but became
the manual for subsequent European offensive and defensive tactics. Indeed, his
influence was still strong as late as the American Civil War.
Vauban's actual contributions to siege tactics are debatable. What he did
mainly was to pull together and codify various 17th century practices into a single
plan of Bttack Bnd ,defense. He is credited with never having lost a fortress on
defense or failing to take one on offense. This, naturally, gave his writings a con·
siderable weight of authority.
We .do not propose to go into the specifics of Vauban's tactics, but there are
certain principles involved which will perhaps shed light on events during the
American Revolution. Vauban believed that the best defense was a good offense;
no fortress was impregnable, with the possible exception of those built in the
middle of swamps where access was difficult for the attacking force. Because a fort
must fall sooner or later using the tactics he advocated, it was the role of the
defenders to delay the inevitable as long as possible so that a relief expe~ition could
lift the siege. The defenders were to throw a succession of obstacles in the path of
the attackers as the siege progressed from an encirclement of the fortress to the
final assault.
The first obstacle was the design of the fort itself. There were four basic
shapes: bastion, star, round, and lunette. Often, features of one type would be
grafted onto another in the large fortifications. The_se forts were basically shaped
to lessen the effects of artillery fire by presenting oblique angles to incoming shells.
At the same time, it was possible for the defenders to cover each part of the fort
from one or more other parts. Surrounding the fort was a ramp of earth called the
glacis which offered no cover for attacking infantry, and, more importantly,
shielded all but the upper portion of the fort walls from artillery fire. Behind this
was a deep ditch filled with water or lined with pickets to impede infantry. Instead
of building a fort with 20 foot high walls, it was better to build one with 10 foot
~lis and surround it with a ditch 10 feet deep.
In the early stag~s of. a siege the attackers would cut off all avenues of
approach to a fort and set up outposts to warn of relief expeditions. They then
began a series of zig-zag trenches up to the walls of the fort connected with laterals
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which were to permit movement between trenches and keep the defenders in the
dark about where the final assault would take place until it was too late to prevent
it. This system of several parallel trenches was apparently Vauban's own contribution to military strategy. It took longer and was more costly than concentrating all
effort on a single trench but the chances for success were greatly increased. When
these trenches got close to the fort the defenders were supposed to sally forth,
preferably at night, and attack the work parties, driving them off and destroying
their trenches by burning the revetting, or shoring, or setting explosives. This was
only a delaying tactic and eventually the attackers would reach the ditch. Here
they would be protected from artillery fire because the defenders would be unable
to depress their cannon sufficiently. The attackers would then bring up their own
artillery to destroy a section of the wall at point-blank range or cross the ditch
under a protective cover against small arms and incendiaries to tunnel under the
wall and plant a large powder charge to blow a breach in the wall. The defenders
would be digging their own tunnels to intercept the attackers and prevent the exploding of the mine.
Once the breach was made, ·the attackers would pour as many men through
the hole as possible and try to overrun as much of the fort as they could before the
defenders could regroup. In larger fortresses, the defenders would throw up
secondary earthworks behind the breach and the attackers would have to repeat the
breaching operation. Hopefully, by this time a relief expedition would have been
successful in driving off the attacking army. With all the trenches, mines, and
countermines dug during a seige "reducing" a fort was an apt term for a successful
attack.
This has been only the briefest exposition of 18th century military strategy,
but may help explain why many of the ··pfficers on both sides of the Revolution
•
seemed so slow and methodical in their m'vements. They wer:e merely following
Vauban's step-by-step precepts. At the sam~ time, one explanation for why leaders
like Benedict Arnold were not advanced despite their success may be that in the
eyes of their superiors they broke too many of the established rules.
(Reference: S. L de Vauban, Manual of Siegecrah and Fortifications, translated by
George A. Rothrock, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1958.)

L11 H. Hanson, Jr. is cu"'nt/y Director of ths U.S. National Park Sarvics's Fort Stanwix
Archasological Projact in Roms, Nsw York. A nativs of Kentucky, hs has been with the Park
Servictl for savsn yean and us also worksd at tha Fortress of Louisbourg, Nova Scotia, and
Fort Donelson, TlnniiSSIII. Hs is tha author of a numbsr of books and artie/as on prehistoric
and historic archasology.

